Abstract. We construct an optimal execution strategy for the purchase of a large number of shares of a financial asset over a fixed interval of time. Purchases of the asset have a nonlinear impact on price, and this is moderated over time by resilience in the limit-order book that determines the price. The limit-order book is permitted to have arbitrary shape. The form of the optimal execution strategy is to make an initial lump purchase and then purchase continuously for some period of time during which the rate of purchase is set to match the order book resiliency. At the end of this period, another lump purchase is made, and following that there is again a period of purchasing continuously at a rate set to match the order book resiliency. At the end of this second period, there is a final lump purchase. Any of the lump purchases could be of size zero. A simple condition is provided that guarantees that the intermediate lump purchase is of size zero.
1. Introduction. We consider optimal execution over a fixed time interval of a large asset purchase in the face of a one-sided limit-order book. We assume that the ask price (sometimes called the best ask price) for the underlying asset is a continuous martingale that undergoes two adjustments during the period of purchase. The first adjustment is that orders consume a part of the limit-order book, and this increases the ask price for subsequent orders. The second adjustment is that resilience in the limit-order book causes the effect of these prior orders to decay over time. In this paper, there is no permanent effect from the purchase we model. However, the temporary effect requires infinite time to completely disappear.
We assume that there is a fixed shadow limit-order book shape toward which resilience returns the limit-order book. At any time, the actual limit-order book relative to the martingale component of the ask price has this shape, but with some left-hand part missing due to prior purchases. An investor is given a period of time and a target amount of asset to be purchased within that period. His goal is to distribute his purchasing over the period in order to minimize the expected cost of purchasing the target. We permit purchases to occur in lumps or to be spread continuously over time. We show that the optimal execution strategy consists of three lump purchases, one or more of which may be of size zero, i.e., does not occur. One of these lump purchases is made at the initial time, one at an intermediate time, and one at the final time. Between these lump purchases, the optimal strategy purchases at a constant rate matched to the limit-order book recovery rate so that the ask price minus its martingale component remains constant. We provide a simple condition under which
For the type of model we consider in this paper, based on a shadow limit-order book, Alfonsi and Schied [2] show that price manipulation is not possible under very general conditions. Furthermore, it is never advantageous to execute intermediate sells while trying to execute an overall buy order. In [2] , trading takes place at finitely many stopping times, and execution is optimized over these stopping times. In the present paper, where trading is continuous, we do not permit intermediate sells.
This simplification of the model is justified by Remark 3.1 below, which argues that intermediate sells cannot reduce the total cost.
The present paper is inspired by Obizhaeva and Wang [10] , who explicitly model the one-sided limit-order book as a means to capture the price impact of order execution. Empirical evidence for the model of [10] and its generalizations by Alfonsi, Fruth and Schied [1, 4] and Alfonsi and Schied [2] are reported in [1, 2, 4, 10] . In [10] and [1] , the limit-order book has a block shape, and in this case the price impact of a purchase is linear, the same as in [8] and [7] . However, the change of mind set is important because it focuses attention on the shape of the limit order book as the determinant of price impact, rather than making assumptions about the price impact directly. This change of mind set was exploited by [2, 4] , who permit more general limit-order book shapes, subject to the condition discussed in Remark 4.4 below. In [2, 4] trading is on a discrete-time grid and it is shown that for an optimal purchasing strategy all purchases except the first and last are of the same size. Furthermore, the size of the intermediate purchases is chosen so that the price impact of each purchase is exactly offset by the order book resiliency before the next purchase. Similar results are obtained in [2] , although here trades are executed at stopping times.
In contrast to [2, 4, 10] , we permit the order book shape to be completely general. However, in our model all price impact is transient; [4, 10] also include the possibility of a permanent linear price impact. In contrast to [2, 4] , we do not assume that the limit order book has a positive density. It can be discrete or continuous and can have gaps. In contrast to [2, 4, 10] , we permit the resilience in the order book to be a function of the adjustments to the martingale component of the ask price. Weiss [18] argues in a discrete-time model that this conforms better to empirical observations. Finally, we set up our model so as to allow for both discrete-time and continuoustime trading, whereas [4, 10] begin with discrete-time trading and then study the limit of their optimal strategies as trading frequency approaches infinity. The simplicity afforded by a fully continuous model is evident in the analysis below. In particular, we provide constructive proofs of Theorems 4.2 and 4.5 that describe the form of the optimal purchasing strategies. Section 2 of this paper presents our model. It contains the definition of the cost of purchasing in our more general framework, and that is preceded by a justification of the definition. Section 3 shows that randomness can be removed from the optimal purchasing problem and reformulates the cost function into a convenient form. In Section 4, we solve the problem, first in the case that is analogous to the one solved by [4] , and then in full generality. Sections 4.1 and 4.3 contain examples.
2. The model. Let T be a positive constant. We assume that the ask price of some asset, in the absence of the large investor modeled by this paper, is a continuous nonnegative martingale A t , 0 ≤ t ≤ T , relative to some filtration {F t } 0≤t≤T satisfying the usual conditions. We assume that
We show below that for the optimal execution problem of this paper, one can assume without loss of generality that this martingale is identically zero. We make this assumption beginning in Section 3 in order to simplify the presentation.
For some extended positive real number M , let µ be an infinite measure on [0, M ) that is finite on each compact subset of [0, M ). Denote the associated left-continuous cumulative distribution function by
This is the shadow limit-order book, in the sense described below. We assume F (x) > 0 for every x > 0. If B is a measurable subset of [0, M ), then in the absence of the large investor modeled in this paper, at time t ≥ 0 the number of limit orders with prices in B + A t {b + A t ; b ∈ B} is µ(B).
There is a strictly positive constant X such that our large investor must purchase X shares over the time interval [0, T ]. His purchasing strategy is a non-decreasing rightcontinuous adapted process X with X T = X. We interpret X t to be the cumulative amount of purchasing done by time t. We adopt the convention X 0− = 0, so that X 0 = ∆X 0 is the number of shares purchased at time zero. Here and elsewhere, we use the notation ∆X t to denote the jump X t − X t− in X at time t.
The effect of the purchasing strategy X on the limit-order book is determined by a resilience function h, a strictly increasing, locally Lipschitz function defined on [0, ∞) and satisfying
The function h together with X determine the volume effect process 1 E satisfying
It is shown in Appendix A that there is a unique nonnegative right-continuous finitevariation adapted process E satisfying (2.3). As with X, we adopt the convention E 0− = 0. We note that ∆X t = ∆E t for 0 ≤ t ≤ T .
Let B be a measurable subset of [0, M ). The interpretation of E is that in the presence of the large investor using strategy X, at time t ≥ 0 the number of limit orders with prices in B + A(t) is µ t (B), where µ t is the σ-finite infinite measure on [0, M ) with left-continuous cumulative distribution function (F (x) − E t )
+ , x ≥ 0. In other words, E t units of mass have been removed from the shadow limit-order book µ. In any interval in which no purchases are made, (2.3) implies
Hence, in the absence of purchases, the volume effect process decays toward zero and the limit-order book tends toward the shadow limit-order book µ, displaced by the ask price A.
To calculate the cost to the investor of using the strategy X, we introduce the following notation. We first define the left-continuous inverse of F , ψ(y) sup{x ≥ 0|F (x) < y}, y > 0.
We set ψ(0) ψ(0+) = 0, where the second equality follows from the assumption that F (x) > 0 for every x > 0. The ask price in the presence of the large investor is defined to be A t + D t , where
This is the price after any lump purchases by the investor at time t (see Fig. 2 .1). We give some justification for calling A t + D t the ask price after the following three examples.
Example 2.1 (Block order book). Let q be a fixed positive number. If q is the quantity of shares available at each price, then for each x ≥ 0, the quantity available at prices in [0, x] is F (x) = qx. This is the block order book considered by [10] . In this case, ψ(y) = y/q and F (ψ(y)) = y for all y ≥ 0. Example 2.2 (Modified block order book). Let 0 < a < b < ∞ be given, and suppose
(2.5) 1 The case that resilience is based on price rather than volume is also considered in [2, 4] . The white area Et corresponds to the amount of shares missing from the order book at time t. The current ask price is At + Dt.
Fig. 2.2. Density and cumulative distribution of the modified block order book
This is a block order book, except that the orders with prices between a and b are not present (see Fig 2. 2). In this case,
We have F (ψ(y)) = y for all y ≥ 0.
Example 2.3 (Discrete order book). Suppose that
which corresponds to an order of size one at each of the nonnegative integers (see Fig.  2 .3). Then
For every nonnegative integer j, we have F (j) = j, F (j+) = j + 1, ψ(j + 1) = j, ψ(j+) = j, F (ψ(j)+) = j and ψ(F (j)+) = j.
We return to the definition of the ask price as A t + D t to provide some justification, leading up to Definition 2.4, for the total cost of a purchasing strategy. Suppose, Suppose at time t, we have E t = y. Then D t = a, but the measure µ t assigns mass zero to [a, b). The ask price is A t + D t , but there are no shares for sale at this price, nor in an interval to the right of this price. Nonetheless, it is reasonable to call A t + D t the ask price for an infinitesimal purchase because if the agent will wait an infinitesimal amount of time before making this purchase, shares will appear at the price A t + D t due to resilience. We make this argument more precise.
Suppose the agent wishes to purchase a small number ε > 0 shares at time t at the ask price A t + D t . This purchase can be approximated by first purchasing zero shares in the time interval [t, t + δ], where δ is chosen so that t+δ t h(E s ) ds = ε and
In other words, E s for t ≤ s < t + δ is given by (2.3) with X held constant (no purchases) over this interval. With δ chosen this way, E (t+δ)− = E t − ε. Resilience in the order book has created ε shares. Suppose the investor purchases these shares at time t + δ, which means that ∆X t+δ = ∆E t+δ = ε and E t+δ = E t . Immediately before the purchase, the ask price is A t+δ + ψ(E t − ε); immediately after the purchase, the ask price is A t+δ + ψ(E t ) = A t+δ + a. The cost of purchasing these shares is
is bounded below by εψ(E t − ε) and bounded above by εa. But a = ψ(E t ) = D t and ψ is left continuous, so the cost per share obtained by dividing (2.9) by ε converges to A t + a = A t + D t as ε (and hence δ) converge down to zero.
On the other hand, an impatient agent who does not wait before purchasing shares could choose a different method of approximating an infinitesimal purchase at time t that leads to a limiting cost per share A t + b. In particular, it is not the case that our definition of ask price is consistent with all limits of discrete-time purchasing strategies. Our definition is designed to capture the limit of discrete-time purchasing strategies that seek to minimize cost.
To simplify calculations of the type just presented, we define the functions
We note that Φ(0) = 0, and we extend Φ to be zero on the negative half-line. In the absence of the large investor, the cost one would pay to purchase all the shares available at prices in the interval [A(t), A(t) + x) at time t would be A(t) + ϕ(x). The function Φ(y) captures the cost, in excess of A t , of purchasing y shares in the absence of the large investor. The first term on the right-hand side of (2.11) is the cost less A t of purchasing all the shares with prices in the interval [A t , A t + ψ(y)). If F has a jump at ψ(y), this might be fewer than y shares. The difference, y − F (ψ(y)) shares, can be purchased at price A t + ψ(y), and this explains the second term on the right-hand side of (2.11). We present these functions in the three examples considered earlier. 
Note that Φ is convex with subdifferential 
For 0 ≤ y ≤ 1, ψ(y) = 0 and hence ϕ(ψ(y)) = 0, [y − F (ψ(y))]ψ(y) = 0, and Φ(y) = 0. For integers k ≥ 1 and k < y ≤ k + 1, (2.8) gives ψ(y) = k, and hence ϕ(ψ(y)) =
For nonnegative integers k and k < y < k + 1, Φ (y) is defined and is equal to ψ(y) = k. Furthermore Φ (0) = ψ(0) = 0. Once again we have ∂Φ(y) = [ψ(y), ψ(y+)] for all y ≥ 0, and because ψ is nondecreasing, Φ is convex (see Fig. 2 
.5).
We decompose the purchasing strategy X into its continuous and pure jump parts X t = X c t + 0≤s≤t ∆X s . The investor pays price A t + D t for infinitesimal purchases at time t, and hence the total cost of these purchases is
On the other hand, if ∆X t > 0, the investor makes a lump purchase of size ∆X t = ∆E t at time t. Because mass E t− is missing in the shadow order book immediately prior to time t, the cost of this purchase is the difference between purchasing E t and purchasing E t− from the shadow order book, i.e., the difference in what the costs of these purchases would be in the absence of the large investor. Therefore, the cost of the purchase ∆X t at time t is A t ∆X t + Φ(E t ) − Φ(E t− ). These considerations lead to the following definition.
Definition 2.4. The total cost incurred by the investor using purchasing strat- 
Our goal is to determine the purchasing strategy X that minimizes EC(X).
Problem simplifications.
To compute the expectation of C(X) defined by (2.14), we invoke the integration by parts formula
for the bounded variation process X and the continuous martingale A. Our investor's strategies must satisfy 0 = X 0− ≤ X t ≤ X T = X, 0 ≤ t ≤ T , and hence
Since the third term on the right-hand side of (3.1) does not depend on X, minimization of EC(X) is equivalent to minimization of the first two terms. But the first two terms do not depend on A, and hence we may assume without loss of generality that A is identically zero. Under this assumption, the cost of using strategy X is
But with A ≡ 0, there is no longer a source of randomness in the problem. Consequently, without loss of generality we may restrict the search for an optimal strategy to nonrandom functions of time. Once we find a nonrandom purchasing strategy minimizing (3.4) below, then even if A is a continuous non-zero nonnegative martingale, we have found a purchasing strategy that minimizes the expected value of (2.14) over all (possibly random) purchasing strategies.
Remark 3.1. We do not allow our agent to make intermediate sells in order to achieve the ultimate goal of purchasing X shares because doing so would not decrease the cost, at least when the total amount of buying and selling is bounded. Indeed, in addition to the purchasing strategy X, suppose the agent has a selling strategy Y , which we take to be a non-decreasing right-continuous adapted process with Y 0− = 0. We assume that both X and Y are bounded. For each t, X t represents the number of shares bought by time t and Y t is the number of shares sold. These processes must be chosen so that X T − Y T = X. We have not modeled the limit buy order book, but if we did so in a way analogous to the model of the limit sell order book, then the bid price at each time t would be less than or equal to A t . Therefore, the net cost of executing the strategy (X, Y ) would satisfy
The integration by parts formula implies
Because we can apply Lemma B.1 to both X and Y , the expectation of
The right-hand side of (3.3) is the formula (3.1) obtained for the cost of using the purchasing strategy X alone, but the X in inequality (3.3) makes a total purchase of
If we replace X by min{X, X}, we obtain a feasible purchasing strategy whose total cost is less than or equal to the right-hand side of (3.3).
Theorem 3.2. Under the assumption (made without loss of generality) that A is identically zero, the cost (3.2) associated with a nonrandom nondecreasing right continuous function X t , 0 ≤ t ≤ T , satisfying X 0− = 0 and X T = X is equal to
Proof. The proof proceeds in two steps. In Step 1 we show that, as we have seen in the examples, Φ is a convex function with subdifferential
In
Step 2 we justify the integration formula
where D − Φ(E t ) denotes the left-hand derivative ψ(E t ) = D t of Φ at E t , and E c is the continuous part of E: E c t = E t − 0≤s≤t ∆E s . From (2.3) and (3.6) we have immediately that
and (3.4) follows from (3.2).
Step 1. Using the integration by parts formula
where the last step follows from the fact that the symmetric difference of the sets
} is at most a countable union of line segments and thus has two-dimensional Lebesgue measure 0. Therefore,
and by Problem 3.6.20, p. 213 of [17] , with ψ and Φ extended to be 0 for the negative reals, we conclude that Φ is convex and that ∂Φ(y) = [ψ(y), ψ(y+)], as desired.
Step 2. We mollify ψ, taking ρ to be a nonnegative C ∞ function with support on [−1, 0] and integral 1, defining ρ n (η) = nρ(nη), and defining
see, e.g., [11] , p. 78. The function E t , 0 ≤ t ≤ T , is bounded. Letting n → ∞ in (3.8) and using the bounded convergence theorem, we obtain
To conclude the proof of (3.6), we divide the sum in (3.9) into two parts. Given δ > 0, we define S δ = {t ∈ [0, T ] : 0 < ∆E t ≤ δ} and S δ = {t ∈ [0, T ] : ∆E t > δ}. The sum in (3.9) is over t ∈ S δ ∪ S δ , and because E has finite variation, t∈S δ ∪S δ ∆E t < ∞. Let ε > 0 be given. We choose δ > 0 so small that t∈S δ ∆E t ≤ ε. Because ψ and hence each ψ n is bounded on [0, E T ], the function Φ and each Φ n is Lipschitz continuous on [0, E T ] with the same Lipschitz constant L = ψ(E T ). It follows that
Hence the difference between t∈S δ Φ(E t ) − Φ(E t− ) and any limit point as n → ∞ of t∈S δ Φ n (E t ) − Φ n (E t− ) is at most 2Lε. On the other hand, the set S δ contains only finitely many elements, and thus
Since ε > 0 is arbitrary, (3.9) reduces to (3.6).
Solution of the Optimization Problem. In view of Theorem 3.2, we want to minimize Φ(E
dt over the set of deterministic purchasing strategies. The main result of this paper is that there exists an optimal strategy X under which the trader buys a lump quantity X 0 = E 0 of shares at time 0, then buys at a constant rate dX t = h(E 0 ) dt up to time t 0 (so as to keep E t = E 0 for t ∈ [0, t 0 )), then buys another lump quantity of shares at time t 0 , subsequently trades again at a constant rate dX t = h(E t0 ) dt until time T (so as to keep E t = E t0 for t ∈ [t 0 , T )), and finally buys the remaining shares at time T . We shall call this strategy a Type B strategy. We further show that if the nonnegative function
is convex, then the purchase at time t 0 consists of 0 shares (so X has only jumps at times 0 and T ). We call such a strategy a Type A strategy. Clearly the latter is a special case of the former.
Although g is naturally defined on [0, h(∞)) by (4.1), we will want it to be defined on a compact set. Therefore we set
and note that because of assumption (2. Secondly, using the definition (2.4) of D t , we can rewrite the cost function formula (3.4) as 
A Type A strategy is fully determined by its initial condition X 
can be written as a function of E x + h(x)T is strictly increasing and continuous on [0, ∞), and k(X) > X. Therefore, there exists a unique e ∈ (0, X) such that k(e) = X. i.e., e + h(e)T = X.
(4.10)
The constraint on the initial condition of Type A strategies that guarantees that the strategy is feasible is 0 ≤ X , then there exists a Type A purchasing strategy that minimizes C(X) over all purchasing strategies X. If g is strictly convex, this is the unique optimal strategy.
Proof. Assume that g is convex and let X be a purchasing strategy. Jensen's inequality applied to (4.4) yields the lower bound
From (2.3) we further have
T 0
h(E t ) dt = X − E T , and thus the lower bound can be rewritten as We show next that the minimum of G over [0, X] is attained in [e, X]. For this, we first observe that because g is convex,
This inequality together with (3.5) and (4.10) implies
X − e T = 0. , and hence the strategy is feasible (see (4.11)). The cost associated with this strategy is less than or equal to the right-hand side of (4.12) (see (4.9) ). This strategy is therefore optimal.
If g is strictly convex at the point X−e * T , where e * minimizes G, then G is strictly convex at e * , and this point is thus the unique minimizer of G. Therefore, every optimal strategy strategy must satisfy E T = e * . By strict convexity of g, a strategy that does not keep h(E) equal to X−e * T almost everywhere in (0, T ), would result in strict inequality in (4.12). Since h is strictly increasing and a process E does not have negative jumps, we conclude that the only optimal strategy is the Type A strategy constructed above.
If g is not strictly convex at the point X−e * T found in the proof of Theorem 4.2, then G might still be strictly convex at e * , in which case there would be only one optimal strategy of Type A, but there could be optimal strategies that are not of Type A. We demonstrate this phenomenon with an example. Example 4.3 (Non-uniqueness of optimal purchasing strategy). Suppose
This function is continuous and strictly increasing, and hence
is also continuous and strictly increasing. This implies that
2 − 29y + 62 − 4 log 2, y ≥ 4.
We take h(x) = x, so that
2 − 29y, y ≥ 4, and
Note that g is nondecreasing, so g is convex, but g is affine on the interval [2, 4] . Finally, we take X = 10 In particular,
In fact, any policy that satisfies 2 ≤ E t ≤ 4, 0 ≤ t < 2, and 2 0 E t dt = 6 will result in the same cost. Indeed, for such a policy we will have
There are infinitely many policies like this. One such is to make an initial lump purchase of size 2, then purchase at rate 2 up to time 1 2 so that E t = 2, 0 ≤ t < 1 2 , make a lump purchase of size 1 at time 1 2 , then purchase at rate 3 up to time [4] consider the case that the measure µ has a strictly positive density f . In this case, the function F (x) = x 0 f (ξ) dξ is strictly increasing and continuous with derivative F (x) = f (x), and its inverse ψ is likewise strictly increasing and continuous with derivative ψ (y) = 1/f (ψ(y)). Furthermore, in [4] the resilience function is h(x) = ρx, where ρ is a positive constant. In this case,
and Theorem 4.2 guarantees the existence of a Type A strategy under the assumption that g is nondecreasing. This is equivalent to the condition that
is nondecreasing.
Alfonsi, Fruth and Schied [4] obtain a discrete-time version of a Type A strategy under the assumption that
is strictly increasing, where τ is the time between trading dates. In order to study the limit of their model as τ ↓ 0, they observe that
which is thus nondecreasing. Thus g given by (4.1) is convex in their model.
To find a simpler formulation of the hypothesis of Theorem 4.2 under the assumption that µ has a strictly positive density f and h(x) = ρx for a positive constant ρ, we compute
This is nonnegative if and only if 2f
2 ψ(y) ≥ yf ψ(y) . Replacing y by F (x), we obtain the condition
This is clearly satisfied under the assumption of [10] that f is a positive constant.
Example 2.1 (Block order book, continued) In the case of the block order book with h(x) = ρx, where ρ is a strictly positive constant,
which is strictly convex. Theorem 4.2 implies that there is an optimal strategy of Type A, and this is the unique optimal strategy. From the formula Φ(e) = 1 2q e 2 , we have
The minimizer is e * =
2X
2+ρT , which lies between e = X 1+ρT and X, as expected. According to Remark 4.1, the optimal strategy of Type A is to make an initial purchase of size
then purchase continuously at rate dX 
Type B Strategies.
Theorem 4.5. In the absence of the assumption that g given by (4.1) is convex, there exists a Type B purchasing strategy that minimizes C(X) over all purchasing strategies X.
The proof of Theorem 4.5 depends on the following lemma, whose proof is given in Appendix C. 
16) (y) = g(y) < g(y), α < y < β.
(4.17)
Proof of Theorem 4.5. Using g in place of g in (4.4), we define the modified cost function
For any purchasing strategy X, we obviously have C(X) ≤ C(X). Analogously to (4.12), for any purchasing strategy X the lower bound
holds. This leads us to consider minimization of the function G(e) Φ(e) + T g X − e T (4.18) over e ∈ [0, X]. As in the proof of Theorem 4.2, this function attains its minimum at some e * ∈ [0, X].
For the remainder of the proof, we use the notation
where it is assumed without loss of generality that e * is the largest minimizer of G in [0, X]. There are two cases. In both cases, we construct a strategy that satisfies E B T = e * and
In the first case, the strategy is a Type A strategy, and it is Type B in the second case. In both cases, we exhibit the strategy explicitly.
Case I. g(y * ) = g(y * ).
It is tempting to claim that we are now in the situation of Theorem 4.2 with the convex function g replacing g. However, the proof needed here that e * ≥ e, where e is determined by (4.10), cannot follow the proof of Theorem 4.2. In the proof of Theorem 4.2, this inequality was a consequence of (4.13), which ultimately depended on the definition (4.1) of g(e). But we only have g(e) ≤ eψ(h −1 (e)); we do not have an equation analogous to (4.1) for g. We thus provide a different proof, which depends on e * being the largest minimizer of G in [0, X].
If x * = 0, then y * = 0, e * = X, and G(e * ) = G(e * ). The Type A strategy that waits until the final time T and then purchases X is optimal. In particular, this strategy satisfies the initial condition
If x * > 0, we must consider two subcases. It could be that 0 < x * ≤ F (0+). In this subcase, g(y
. But g(0) = 0 and g is nondecreasing, so g ≡ 0 on [0, y * ]. Furthermore, x * is positive, so e * < X. For e ∈ (e * , X), the number
is in (0, y * ), and by (3.5), D + G(e) = D + Φ(e) = ψ(e+). On the other hand, e * is the largest minimizer of G in [0, X], which implies D + G(e) > 0. This shows that ψ(e+) > 0 for every e ∈ (e * , X), which implies that ψ(e) > 0 for every e ∈ (e * , X) and further implies that e ≥ F (0+) for every e ∈ (e * , X). We conclude that e * ≥ F (0+). Applying h to this inequality and using the subcase assumption x * ≤ F (0+), we obtain
In other words, e * +h(e * )T ≥ X, and by the defining equation (4.10) of e, we conclude that e * ≥ e. The corresponding optimal strategy, which is Type A, satisfies X A 0 = x * and E A T = e * . The proof of optimality of this strategy follows the proof of Theorem 4.2 with g replacing g.
Finally, we consider the subcase x * > F (0+). Because y * = h(x * ) is positive, the left-hand derivative of g at y * is defined, and it satisfies
In fact, the inequality in (4.22) is strict. It it were not, the affine function
would describe a tangent line to the graph of g at (y * , g(y * )) lying below g(y), and hence below g(y), for all y ∈ [0, Y ]. But the resulting inequality yψ(
, and letting y ↓ 0, we would conclude ψ(x * ) = 0. This violates the subcase assumption x * > F (0+). We conclude that D − g(y * ) > ψ(x * ). The strict inequality, the fact that e * minimizes G, and (3.5) further imply
T . This is the essential part of inequality (4.21), and we conclude as above, constructing an optimal Type A strategy with
Case II. g(y * ) < g(y * ).
Recall from Lemma 4.6 that this case can occur only if 0 < y * < Y . In particular, x * > 0. We let to be the affine function and α and β be numbers as described in Lemma 4.6, and we construct a Type B strategy. To do this, we define t 0 ∈ (0, T ) by
so that αt 0 + β(T − t 0 ) = y * T . Consider the Type B strategy that makes an initial purchase X B 0 = h −1 (α), then purchases at rate dX
, follows this with a purchase ∆X
, and makes a final purchase X − X B T − at time T . According to (2.3),
In particular,
We show at the end of this proof that
This will ensure that ∆X B T is nonnegative, and since X B is obviously nondecreasing on [0, T ), this will establish that X B is a feasible purchasing strategy.
Accepting (4.25) for the moment, we note that (4.24) implies
Using (4.4), (4.26), (4.16), the linearity of , and (4.17) in that order, we compute
This is (4.20).
Finally, we turn to the proof of (4.25). Because e * is the largest minimizer of the convex function G in [0, X] and e * < X (because x * > 0), the right-hand derivative of G at e * must be nonnegative. Indeed, for all e ∈ (e * , X), this right-hand derivative must in fact be strictly positive. For e greater than but sufficiently close to e * ,
X−e T is in (α, y * ), where g is linear with slope
This inequality ψ h −1 (β) < ψ(e+) for all e greater than but sufficiently close to e * implies (4.25).
Remark 4.7 (Uniqueness). In Case I of the proof of Theorem 4.5, when g(y * ) = g(y * ), strict convexity of g at y * implies uniqueness of the optimal purchasing strategy. The proof is similar to the uniqueness proof in Theorem 4.2.
However, in Case II g is not strictly convex at y * . In this case, if ψ is strictly increasing at e * and if the affine function of Lemma 4.6 agrees with g only at α and β, then the optimal purchasing strategy is unique. Indeed, if ψ is strictly increasing at e * , then Φ and hence G are strictly convex at e * , which implies that e * is the unique minimizer of G. In order to be optimal, a purchasing strategy must satisfy the two inequalities
with equality, as we explain below, and must also satisfy E T = e * . When the inequalities (4.27) hold, we can use (2.3) to obtain a lower bound on the cost of an arbitrary purchasing strategy X by relations
The minimal cost is G(e * ) = Φ(e * )+T g(
, and hence optimality of a strategy requires that equality hold in both parts of (4.27). The second inequality in (4.27) is Jensen's inequality, and equality holds if and only if h(E t ), 0 ≤ t < T , stays in the region in which g is affine. But the average value of h(E t ),
h(E t )dt, is equal to y * , and hence we cannot have h(E t ) < y * for all t ∈ [0, T ), nor can we have h(E t ) > y * for all t ∈ [0, T ). Hence the region in which h(E t ) stays must be the region in which g agrees with . To get an equality in the first inequality in (4.27), h(E t ), 0 ≤ t < T , must stay in the region where g agrees with g. If agrees with g only at the two points α and β, then h(E t ), 0 ≤ t < T , must stay in the two-point set {α, β}. Because ∆E t = ∆X t ≥ 0 for all t, there must be some initial time interval [0, t 0 ) on which h(E t ) = α and there must be some final time interval [t 0 , T ) on which h(E t ) = β. In order to achieve this and to also have
h(E t ) = y * , t 0 must be given by (4.23).
Examples of Type B optimal strategies.
Example 2.2 (Modified block order book, continued). We continue Example 2.2 under the simplifying assumptions T = 1 and h(x) = x for all x ≥ 0, so h −1 (y) = y for all y ≥ 0 and Y = X. Recalling (2.6) and (4.1), we see that
The convex hull of g over [0, ∞), given by (4.14), is (see Fig. 4 .1). We take X = Y > β so that this is also the convex hull of g over [0, Y ].
For a < y * < β, we have g(y * ) < g(y). For constants α and β from the statement of Lemma 4.6 (see (C.1)-(C.2) in Appendix C), we have α of (C.1) is a, and β of (C.2) is given by (4.28). In order to illustrate a case in which a Type B purchasing strategy is optimal, we assume a + 2β < X < 3β.
(4.29)
The function G of (4.18) is minimized over [0, X] at e * if and only if
which is equivalent to ∂Φ(e * ) ∩ ∂ g(X − e * ) = ∅. We show below that the largest value of e * satisfying this condition is e * = 2β. According to (4.29), e * = 2β is in (X − β, X − a). Because β > a, e * is also in (a, ∞). We compute (recall (2.12))
and then evaluate ∂Φ(e * ) = {e
Therefore, G attains its minimum at e * .
To see that there is no e ∈ (2β, X] where G attains its minimum, we observe that for e ∈ (2β, X − a), ∂Φ(e) ∩ ∂ g(X − e) = {e + b − a} ∩ {2β + b − a} = ∅. For e ∈ [X − a, X], all points in ∂ g(X − e) lie in the interval [0, 2a] , whereas the only point in ∂Φ(e), which is e + b − a, lies in the interval [X + b − 2a, X + b − a]. Because of (4.29), we have 2a < X + b − 2a, and hence ∂Φ(e) ∩ ∂ g(X − e) = ∅ for e ∈ [X − a, X].
As in the proof of Theorem 4.5, we set y * = X − e * = X − 2β, x * = h −1 (y * ) = X − 2β. Condition (4.29) is equivalent to a < y * < β, which in turn is equivalent to g(y * ) < g(y * ). The first inequality in (4.29) shows that x * > 0, and we are thus in Case II of the proof of Theorem 4.5. In this case, we define
The optimal purchasing strategy is
In particular, ∆X 0 = a, ∆X t0 = β − a, ∆X 1 = β (see (4.24) for the last equality).
The corresponding E B process is
The initial lump purchase moves the ask price to the left endpoint a of the gap in the order book. Purchasing is done to keep the ask price at a until time t 0 , when another lump purchase moves the ask price to β, beyond the right endpoint b of the gap in the order book. Purchasing is done to keep the ask price at β until the final time, when another lump purchase is executed. Example 2.3 (Discrete order book, continued). We continue Example 2.3 under the simplifying assumptions that T = 1 and h(x) = x for all x ≥ 0, so that h −1 (y) = y for all y ≥ 0 and Y = X. From (2.8) and (4.1) we see that g(0) = 0, and g(y) = ky for integers k ≥ 0 and k < y ≤ k + 1. In particular, g(k) = (k − 1)k for nonnegative integers k. The convex hull of g interpolates linearly between the points (k, (k − 1)k) and (k + 1, k(k + 1)), i.e., g(y) = k(2y − (k + 1)) for k ≤ y ≤ k + 1, where k ranges over the nonnegative integers (see Fig. 4.2) . Therefore,
, 2k], y = k and k is a positive integer, {2k}, k < y < k + 1 and k is a nonnegative integer.
Recall from the discussion following (2.13) that
, y = k and k is a positive integer, {k}, k < y < k + 1 and k is a nonnegative integer.
We seek the largest number e * ∈ [0, X] for which ∂Φ(e * ) ∩ ∂ g(X − e * ) = ∅. This is the largest minimizer of G(e) = Φ(e) + g(X − e) in [0, X]. We define k * to be the largest integer less than or equal to
We divide the analysis into three cases:
We show below that in Cases A and B, the optimal strategy makes an initial lump purchase of size k * , which executes the orders at prices 0, 1, . . . , k * − 1. In Case A the optimal strategy then purchases at rate k * over the interval (0, 1), and at time 1 makes a final lump purchase of size X − 2k * , which is in the interval [k * , k * + 1]. This is a Type A strategy. In Case B there is an intermediate lump purchase of size one at time 3k * + 2 − X. Before this intermediate purchase, the rate of purchase is k * and after this purchase, the rate of purchase is k * + 1. In Case B at time 1 there is a final lump purchase of size k * . In Case B we have a Type B strategy. In Case C, the optimal strategy makes a lump purchase of size k * + 1 at time 0, which executes the orders at prices 0, 1, . . . , k * − 1, k * . The optimal strategy then purchases continuously at rate k * + 1 over the interval (0, 1), and at time 1 makes a final lump purchase of size X − 2k * − 2, which is in the interval [k * , k * + 1). This is a Type A strategy.
We define e * = X − k * , so that 2k * ≤ e * ≤ 2k * + 1 and k * = X − e * . Then 2k * ∈ ∂Φ(e * ) and ∂ g(X − e * ) = [2(k * − 1), 2k * ], so the intersection of ∂Φ(e * ) and ∂ g(X − e * ) is nonempty, as desired. On the other hand, if e > e * , then ∂Φ(e) ⊂ [2k * , X] and ∂ g(X − e) ⊂ [0, 2(k * − 1)], so the intersection of these two sets is empty.
In this case, y * and x * defined by (4.19) are both equal to k * and hence g(y * ) = g(y * ). If k * = 0, we are in the first subcase of Case I of the proof of Theorem 4.5. The optimal purchasing strategy is to do nothing until time 1, and then make a lump purchase of size X. If k * = 1, which is equal to F (0+), we are in the second sub-case of Case I of the proof of Theorem 4.5. We should make an initial purchase of size x * = 1, purchase continuously over the time interval (0, 1) at rate 1 so that that E t ≡ 1 and D t ≡ 0, and make a final purchase of size X − 2. If k * ≥ 2, we are in the third subcase of Case I of the proof of Theorem 4.5. We should make an initial purchase of size k * , purchase continuously over the time interval (0, 1) at rate k * so that E t ≡ k * and D t ≡ k * − 1, and make a final purchase of size X − 2k * .
Case B: 3k * + 1 < X < 3k * + 2.
We define e * = 2k * + 1, so that k * < X − e * < k * + 1. Then ∂Φ(e * ) = [2k * , 2k * + 1] and 2k * ∈ ∂ g(X − e * ), so the intersection of ∂Φ(e * ) and ∂ g(X − e * ) is nonempty, as desired. On the other hand, if e > e * , then ∂Φ(e) ⊂ [2k * + 1, X] and ∂ g(X − e) ⊂ [0, 2k * ], so the intersection of these two sets is empty.
In this case, y * and x * defined by (4.19) are both equal to X − e * . Hence k * < y * < k * +1, g(y * ) < g(y * ), and we are in Case IIof the proof of Theorem 4.5 with α = k * and β = k * + 1 (see (4.14)-(4.17) and (C.1)-(C.2)).The optimal purchasing strategy is Type B. In particular, with t 0 = β − y * = k * + 1 − x * = 3k * + 2 − X, the optimal purchasing strategy makes an initial lump purchase α = k * , which executes the orders at prices 0, 1,. . . ,k * −1, then purchases continuously over the interval (0, t 0 ) at rate k * so that E t ≡ k * and D t ≡ k * − 1, at time t 0 makes a lump purchase of size β − α = 1, which consumes the order at price k * , then purchases continuously over the interval (t 0 , 1) at rate k * + 1 so that E t ≡ k * + 1 and D t ≡ k * , and finally executes a lump purchase of size e * −β = k * (see (4.24)) at time 1. The total quantity purchased is k * + k * t 0 + 1 + (k * + 1)(1 − t 0 ) + k * = X, as required.
Case C: 3k * + 2 ≤ X < 3k * + 3.
We define e * = X − k * − 1, so that 2k * + 1 ≤ e * < 2k * + 2 and X − e * = k * + 1. Then 2k * + 1 ∈ ∂Φ(e * ) and g(X − e * ) = [2k * , 2k * + 2], and the intersection of ∂Φ(e * ) and ∂ g(X − e * ) is nonempty, as desired. On the other hand, if e > e * , then ∂Φ(e) ⊂ [2k * + 1, X] and ∂ g(X − e) ⊂ [0, 2k * ], so the intersection of these two sets is empty. In this case, y * and x * are both equal to k * + 1. The optimal purchasing strategy falls into either second (if k * = 0) or third (if k * ≥ 1) subcases of Case I of the proof of Theorem 4.5.
Appendix A. The process E. In this appendix we prove that there exists a unique adapted process E satisfying (2.3) pathwise, and we provide a list of its properties.
Lemma A.1. Let h be a nondecreasing, real-valued, locally Lipschitz function defined on [0, ∞) such that h(0) = 0. Let X be a purchasing strategy. Then there exists a unique bounded adapted process E depending pathwise on X such that (2.3) is satisfied. Furthermore, (i) E is right continuous with left limits; (ii) ∆E t = ∆X t for all t; (iii) E has finite variation on [0, T ]; (iv) E takes values in [0, X].
Proof. Because we do not know a priori that E is nonnegative, we extend h to all of R by defining h(x) = 0 for x < 0. This extended h is nondecreasing and locally Lipschitz. and hence
Gronwall's inequality implies that E ε → E as ε ↓ 0. Since E ε t ≥ 0, we must have E t ≥ 0 for all t. Equation (2.3) now implies that E t ≤ X t , and therefore E t ≤ X. The proof of (iv) is complete.
When h is locally but not globally Lipschitz, we leth be equal to h on [0, X], h(x) = 0 for x < 0, andh(x) = h(X) for x > X. We apply the previous arguments tõ h, and we observe that the resultingẼ satisfies the equation corresponding to h.
Remark A.2. The pathwise construction of E in the proof of Lemma A.1 shows that if X is deterministic, then so is E. Finally, we describe the situation when for some y * ∈ [0, Y ], we have g(y * ) < g(y * ). We have shown that this can happen only if 0 < y * < Y . Let be a support line of g at y * ,which is an affine function that attains the maximum in (4.14) at the point y * . In particular, ≤ g ≤ g and (y * ) = g(y * ). Define Because g is continuous, the minimum of g − over [0, Y ] is attained. This minimum cannot be a positive number ε, for then + ε would be an affine function lying below g. Therefore, either the supremum in (C.1) or the infimum in (C.2) is taken over a nonempty set. In the former case, we must have g(α) = (α), whereas in the latter case g(β) = (β).
Let us consider first the case that g(α) = (α). Define γ = would lie below g but have a larger value at y * than , violating the choice of . It follow that g − attains the minimum value zero on [γ, Y ], and since this function is strictly positive on [γ, y * ], the minimum is attained to the right of y * . This implies that g(β) = (β). Similarly, if we begin with the assumption that g(β) = (β), we can argue that g(α) = (α).
In conclusion, α and β defined by (C.1) and (C.2) satisfy (4.15) and (4.16). Finally, (4.16) shows that restricted to [α, β] is the largest affine function lying below g on this interval, and hence (4.17) holds.
Because of (4.16), every affine function lying below g on [0, Y ] must lie below on [α, β] . If such an affine function agrees with g and hence with at y * , it must in fact agree with everywhere. Hence, is the only function lying below g on [0, Y ] and agreeing with g at y * .
